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Low-Wage Employment versus Unemployment: 
Which One Provides Better Prospects for Women? 
 
This study analyzes state dependence in low-wage employment of western German women 
using GSOEP data, 2000-2006. We estimate dynamic multinomial logit models with random 
effects and find that having a low-wage job increases the probability of being low-paid and 
decreases the chances of being high-paid in the future, in particular for low-paid women 
working part-time. However, concerning future wage prospects low-paid women are clearly 
better off than unemployed or inactive women. We argue that for women low-wage jobs can 
serve as stepping stones out of unemployment and are to be preferred to staying 
unemployed and waiting for a better job. 
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 While unemployment is a bad signal, being in a low-quality job may
well be a worse one. (Layard et al., 1991, p. 249)
1 Introduction
In many European countries, low-wage employment has become a more and more
important characteristic of labor markets and a controversial topic for debate, in
particular since a disproportionate share of low-wage earners are women (European
Commission, 2004). It is an open and highly disputed question how the prominence
of low-wage work is to be interpreted and whether low-paid work is benecial to
individuals or society. The answer to this question crucially depends on whether low-
wage jobs are mainly transitory and serve as stepping stones to higher paid jobs or
whether they tend to become persistent or even result in (repeated) unemployment.
More specically, is it better to take up a low-wage job or remain unemployed and
wait for a better job oer?
On the one hand, accepting low-quality jobs avoids scarring eects of
unemployment, and these jobs may serve as stepping stones into high-quality jobs.
In other words: taking up an interim job may be better than having no job at
all (McCormick, 1990). On the other hand, individuals could be trapped in low-
quality jobs or driven into repeated unemployment for various reasons. For instance,
employers may interpret bad jobs in an individual's employment history as indicators
of low future productivity (McCormick, 1990). Similarly, accumulation of human
capital in low-quality jobs is limited (Dickens and Lang, 1985) and probably not
much higher than during unemployment - in particular when unemployed persons
receive training measures. Furthermore, transaction costs complicate job mobility. If
costs of search dier between employment states (Burdett, 1978), on-the-job-search
is likely to be less eective than search during unemployment.
Knowing the consequences and future employment prospects of taking up a low-
wage job is not only important for (unemployed) individuals but also for government
when designing labor market institutions and policies. There are a number of labor
2market policies that may hinder or force unemployed individuals to accept sub-
optimal job oers and low-paid work. While unemployment benets provide a search
subsidy for nding a good job match (Burdett, 1979; Marimon and Zilibotti, 1999),
sanctions on rejections of job oers may drive unemployed persons into low-quality
jobs (Van den Berg and Vikstr om, 2009). Moreover, unemployed individuals are often
subsidized by government when taking up a low-wage job, and many individuals in
subsidized jobs earn low wages (Stephan, 2009). Whether these policies are helpful
depends very much on the prospects of low-wage earners (compared to unemployed
persons) and on their transitions out of the low-wage sector.
In order to answer these questions, the labor market dynamics of low-paid and
unemployed individuals must be investigated. Here, it should be taken into account
that current labor market outcomes may aect future employment prospects, a
phenomenon called (true) state dependence (Heckman, 1981b). The experience of
a low-wage job may alter prices, preferences or constraints and therefore have a
genuine eect on the probability of being high-paid or unemployed in future periods.
As explained earlier, this could be due to low human capital accumulation, signalling
eects or transaction costs. Furthermore, individual characteristics (as well as labor
market conditions) determine the probability of the experience of labor market
states. If this individual-specic heterogeneity is correlated over time this may lead
to persistence in low-pay (and spurious state dependence). If this is not controlled
for in the econometric analysis, the estimated eect of a low-wage job on future
labor market prospects will be biased.
In recent years, state dependence regarding labor market transitions between
low-wage employment, high-wage employment and unemployment has been analyzed
by Stewart (2007) for the UK and by Uhlendor (2006) for Germany. Both apply
dynamic discrete choice models. While Stewart (2007) nds that low-wage earners
incur the same unemployment risk as unemployed persons, Uhlendor (2006) shows
that for men low-wage employment is associated with weaker scarring eects than
unemployment. A second strand of the literature has investigated the determinants
3of labor market transitions using multivariate probit models. For men in Britain,
Cappellari and Jenkins (2008) nd that the entry into low-wage employment is more
probable for singles, young individuals and those with low qualication, whereas
the probability of becoming unemployed is higher for singles and individuals with
bad health. Cappellari (2007) studies transitions of low-wage earners in Italy and
concludes that getting low-paid strongly increases the probability of being in the
low-wage sector in the future. The transition into high-wage employment is aected
by region, industry and rm size. Schank et al. (2009) nd that in Germany upward
mobility is lower for women, for older workers and in small establishments.
In this paper, we apply dynamic multinomial logit models to investigate state
dependence of low-wage employment. We test how state dependence diers with
respect to rm and individual characteristics. We analyze the unemployment risk
and the upward mobility of low-wage earners and are able to show in which
circumstances low-wage jobs can serve as stepping stones. In contrast to previous
studies, we distinguish between ve states, namely high-wage employment, low-wage
employment (part-time and full-time), unemployment and inactivity.
Whereas Uhlendor (2006) analyzes western German men in the period 1998
to 2003, our focus is on the labor market dynamics of women in western Germany
between 2000 and 2006. The vast majority of low-wage earners in Germany are
women, and their chance of obtaining higher wages is signicantly lower than that of
men (Schank et al., 2009). In contrast to men, women are more involved in household
production and thus more often inactive on the labor market or working part-time.
Hence it is important to distinguish between low-wage earners working full-time
or part-time (which may be associated with occupational downgrading, see Prowse
(2008)), and to account for inactivity as an additional state. Since labor market
dynamics of women could dier considerably from those of men, it will be interesting
to see whether the extant results for low-paid men also hold for women.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 describes the dataset and descriptive
statistics. Section 3 discusses the empirical specication. Section 4 presents the
4results and section 5 concludes.
2 Data
We use the waves 2000{2006 of the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP).
The GSOEP is a representative longitudinal study of private households in Germany.
Interviews have been carried out yearly since 1984. The GSOEP includes detailed
information on the working life of the interviewed persons, but also a wide range
of socio-economic variables related to other research elds. In 2006 22,639 adult
persons from 12,499 households were sampled (Wagner et al., 2007).
For our analysis, we rst dene four mutually exclusive labor market states: high-
wage employment, low-wage employment (where we subsequently also distinguish
between full- and part-time work), unemployment, and inactivity. To distinguish
between unemployed and inactive women, we rely on the ILO denition of
unemployment. An individual is considered as unemployed if she does not work, has
actively searched for a job within the last four weeks and is ready to take up a job
within the next two weeks. Individuals which are neither employed nor unemployed
are dened as inactive.
We restrict our analysis to western Germany since labor market conditions
and particularly the wage level still dier remarkably between western and eastern
Germany. Furthermore we exclude self-employed, trainees, students, women who
are in disabled employment, and women working in agriculture. The share of low-
paid workers employed in this sector is so small that it would be dicult to draw
conclusions about their branch-specic labor market opportunities. Since we are
not interested in transitions from education to work and transitions from work to
retirement, we do not investigate labor market transitions of women who are younger
than 20 in 2000 and older than 55 in 2006.
In order to take account of the business cycle, we add data from the Federal
Employment Agency about monthly unemployment rates at the month of the
GSOEP-interview. We form an unbalanced dataset including all individuals who
5are observed in the years 2000 and 2001. An individual stays in the sample until the
rst wave in which she is not observed or has a missing value in one of the considered
variables.
Following a large part of the literature, we dene an individual as low-paid if
she earns less than two thirds of the median hourly gross wage and as high-paid if
her wage is above this threshold. The low-wage thresholds are calculated for each
year among the whole western German population using a weighted sample. They
lie between 8.06 Euro in 2000 and 8.47 Euro in 2003 and decline to 7.99 Euro in
2006 (in prices of 2000).
- Table 1 about here -
Table 1 reports sample statistics broken down by labor market states. 51 percent
of women in the pooled unweighted regression sample work in high-wage jobs, 14
percent are low-paid, 4 percent are unemployed while 31 percent are inactive. High-
paid women are on average older than low-paid, unemployed and inactive women.
Unsurprisingly, high-paid women tend to be better educated. Individuals with a
migration background are overrepresented in unemployment and inactivity, while
the share of migrants is lower in low-wage and high-wage employment. The share
of women with children is always smallest in high-wage employment and (in most
age groups) largest in inactivity, where the dierences are most pronounced with
respect to children younger than 4 years. In comparison with high-paid women, low-
paid women more often have children, work in jobs with less than 30 working hours,
in small rms and in the construction sector, while high-paid women work more
frequently in the service sector.
- Table 2 about here -
Table 2 shows the yearly transitions between the four labor market states.
6State dependence seems to be strong for high-wage employment and inactivity,
with over 80 percent of individuals staying in these segments. About 33 percent
of the unemployed are observed to be in the same state in the consecutive year.
61 percent of low-paid workers stay in low-wage employment. Low-paid women
clearly have worse labor market opportunities than high-paid, i. e. they have lower
probabilities to be high-paid and higher probabilities to be unemployed or inactive
in the future. However, concerning these unconditional measures, low-paid women
still have considerably better prospects than unemployed women.
Thus, regarding transition probabilities, it seems plausible that low-wage jobs
can serve as stepping stones out of unemployment. Nevertheless, in order to draw
conclusions for labor market policy, one has to assess whether the unequal labor
market opportunities stem from dierences in individual characteristics of low-paid
and unemployed individuals or from a genuine eect of experiencing these labor
market states.
3 Empirical Specication
The multinomial model for the latent propensity Y  of individual i to be in




ijt = xitj + yit 1j + ij + ijt (1)
where i = 1;:::;N; j = 1;:::;4; t = 1;:::;T.1 x is a vector of strictly exogenous
observable characteristics, which may be associated with the employment status.
To capture state dependence, y is a vector of three mutually exclusive dummy
variables (low-wage, unemployed, inactive) indicating the observed employment
state in period t 1. ijt denotes a strictly exogenous disturbance and ij measures
individual-specic and time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Its inclusion allows
1In subsequent analysis we stratify the low-wage status into part-time and full-time work, such
that there will be ve states.
7us to disentangle true state dependence (through j) and spurious state dependence
(through ij).
The standard uncorrelated random eects model assumes  to be uncorrelated
with x. However, if this assumption is violated, then the estimate of  will pick up
some of the unobservables . As an example,  may include an individual's attitude
towards classical roles of men and women, which is likely to be correlated both
with the employment status of a woman as well as with the number of a woman's
children. If the latter is included in the x-vector, its impact on, say, the probability
of not being in the labor force is likely to be overestimated. Alternatively, following
Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1984), the ij and the observed characteristics
are allowed to be correlated by modelling ij to be linear in the means of all time-
varying covariates
ij =  xij + ij (2)
where ij is independent of xit and ijt for all i;t;j. Inserting into equation (1) yields:
y

ijt = xitj + yit 1jt +  xij + ij + ijt (3)
Correlation of the unobservables ij and the initial observation yi1 leads to the
so-called initial conditions problem. This problem does not arise if the yi1 are known
constants (that is non-stochastic). However, this is certainly not the case if (as in
the context of our study) the rst year of the observed panel data does not coincide
with the start of the stochastic process generating individuals' employment status.2
For example, an individual who is a low-wage employee in t = 1 may be there
because of a previous low-wage employment (state dependence) or because of some
observed or unobserved characteristics aecting this propensity. Thus, the initial
values are endogenous, which requires the specication of a conditional distribution
for yi1. However, it is typically not possible to nd a solution for the conditional
2In the context of our study, S periods have passed before the rst observation is observed.
Thus t = 1 actually means S + 1, without loosing any generality.
8distribution which is consistent with the rest of the model.
Heckman (1981a) suggests an approximate solution to the conditional
distribution of the initial values using a reduced-form equation of the following form:
y

ij1 = zij + ij + ij1; (4)
where z includes observed variables in the rst period and available pre-sample
information.
An alternative estimator has been proposed by Wooldridge (2005) which has the
virtue of being computationally more tractable.3 The distribution of unobserved
individual heterogeneity is specied conditional on initial values and exogenous
variables, similar to the strategy of Chamberlain (1984) discussed above.
ij =  xij + yi1j + ij (5)
Substitution into into equation (1) yields:
y

ijt = xitj + yit 1jt + yi1j +  xij + ij + ijt (6)
We assume that the ijt follow a Type I extreme value distribution, resulting in a
dynamic multinomial logit model with random eects. The probability of individual
i being in employment state j at time t > 1 is given by:
P(yijtjxit;yit 1;ij) =
exp(xitj + yit 1j + yi1j +  xij + ij)
P4
k=1 exp(xitk + yit 1k + yi1k +  xik + ik)
(7)
Being high-paid is the base category and the coecient vectors 1, 1, 1, 1
and the unobserved heterogeneity i1 are set to zero. If the random eects ij were
3Studies also relying on the Wooldrige approach include Contyannis et al. (2004), Haan (2005),
Stewart (2007) and Arulampalam and Stewart (2007). Akay (2009) shows with Monte Carlo
experiments based on dynamic random-eects probit and tobit models that the Heckman reduced
form approximation is preferred in panels shorter than 5 periods.








where dijt = 1 if individual i is in labor market state j at time t. Since the ij are
not observed, however, the likelihood contribution is given by the expected value









exp(xitj + yit 1j + yi1j +  xij + ij)
1 +
P4
k=2 exp(xitk + yit 1k + yi1k +  xik + ik)
dijt
f()d() (9)
Unobserved heterogeneity i  (i2;i3;i4)0 is assumed to follow a multivariate
normal distribution with an unrestricted variance-covariance structure. There exists
no analytical solution for the integral in (9), such that approximative methods
must be used. Since numerical procedures like the Gauss-Hermite quadrature or
adaptive quadrature are computationally intensive, we estimate the model with
maximum simulated likelihood (MSL).4 MSL draws values from the distribution
of the unobserved heterogeneity. For each of these draws, the likelihood is calculated
and then the sum is averaged over the R draws, which implies that instead of the



















Following Haan and Uhlendor (2006) and Uhlendor (2006), (quasi-random)
Halton sequences are applied instead of random draws to obtain r
i.5 In this paper,
4We use a Stata routine from Haan and Uhlendor (2006), which we adjusted from two to three
(and later on four) random intercepts.
5For details, see Train (2003) or Cameron and Trivedi (2005, chapter 12). Computer time can
be reduced when using Halton draws because they provide a better coverage of the sample space
and a lower variance of the simulated likelihoods.
10we use 200 Halton draws per individual.
4 Results
Table 3 presents the marginal eects (evaluated at sample means) of the dynamic
multinomial logit model for dierent labor market states of western German women.6
The highly signicant eects of the labor market states in the rst observed period
(t = 1) indicate that the initial state is strongly correlated with unobserved
characteristics and that it is indeed necessary to control for the initial conditions
problem. Signicant estimates of 2
j and k;j imply the existence of unobserved
heterogeneity. Furthermore, since all correlation coecients are signicant, it would
be statistically inappropriate to omit one category.7 The positive correlation
coecients indicate that unobserved characteristics of low-paid, unemployed and
inactive persons are similar, but dierent from unobserved characteristics of high-
paid workers.
- Table 3 about here -
The x-vector contains all the control variables listed in Table 3 plus year
dummies. In comparison with no education, an apprenticeship and (even more) a
university degree increase the probability of high-pay.8 Inactivity is more likely to
occur if a person is handicapped. As expected, children at age three or below are
associated with a higher probability of being inactive, while there is a negative
6The results reported in this section are based on an unbalanced panel, but Akay (2009) shows
with Monte Carlo experiments that the Wooldridge method is only very slightly biased when using
unbalanced datasets. Moreover, estimates with a balanced panel are very similar to those shown
in Table 3. However, we do not present results for the balanced panel because in the subsequent
analysis below, where we distinguish between low-wage full-time and low-wage part-time workers
(Table 5), the likelihood did not converge for the balanced sample.
7This is often the case in previous empirical investigations which neglect the group of inactive
persons (mainly due to lack of data).
8As there is no within-variation, we have not been able to include the means of the education
dummies in the  x-vector. Therefore, the positive relationship between education and high-wage
jobs may partly capture unobserved ability.
11relationship with high-wage employment.9 Although quantitatively smaller, the
same eects are found for children between four and ten, while the estimates for
children above ten are all insignicant. As expected, the local unemployment rate is
negatively correlated with being high-paid, but it is statistically not signicant.
We turn now to the main variables of interest which are the lagged labor market
states. Being high-paid in t   1 serves as the reference category, such that the
reported marginal eects must be interpreted relative to this group. We observe
true state dependence for low-paid western German women: being low-paid in year
t 1 increases the probability of being low-paid in year t and reduces the probability
of being high-paid in t. Both eects are equal in absolute size. The marginal eects
of low-pay in year t   1 on the other two labor market states (unemployed and
inactive) are zero. Taken together, these estimates imply that being low-paid in year
t   1 increases the probability of being unemployed or inactive in year t (where the
marginal eects are zero) compared to the probability of being high paid in year
t (where the marginal eects are negative). This is consistent with the results of
Uhlendor (2006) for men.
While a low-pay state in year t   1 reduces the likelihood of being in high-
pay employment in t, unemployment or inactivity in t   1 is even worse. The
marginal eects ( 0:159 for low-pay versus  0:372 and  0:462 for unemployment
respectively inactivity) dier substantially, and their condence intervals do not
overlap. Moreover, the probability of being unemployed in year t or being inactive
in year t rises with unemployment in t 1, but is unaected by low-pay employment
in t   1 (compared to high-wage jobs in t   1). Therefore, we can conclude that for
our sample of western German women working in a low-paid job is indeed better
for future employment prospects than not working. Uhlendor (2006) obtained the
same pattern for men in western Germany, while for Britain Stewart (2007) found
only insignicant dierences between low-wage employment and unemployment on
future prospects.
9Of course, these eects may reect reverse causality, i.e. that high-wage jobs reduce fertility.
12- Table 4 about here -
Next, we investigate whether the eects of being low-paid in t   1 dier by
subgroups. For this reason, we have interacted the labor market state low-pay in
t   1 with broad categories of sector, rm size and children in the household, the
results of which are reported in Table 4.10 First of all, we should note that the
marginal eects of unemployment or inactivity in t 1 are almost identical to those
in Table 3. We observe that there is no signicant variation in the impact of low-
wage employment in t   1 across sectors. By contrast, working for a large rm
increases the likelihood of upward mobility and reduces the probability of becoming
unemployed or inactive (which may reect the existence of internal labor markets or
other opportunities to accumulate human capital). As expected, if there are young
children in the household a women is more likely to move from low-pay employment
to inactivity whereas upward mobility is less likely (compared to no children in the
household).11 Transition probabilities are not aected, however, by the existence of
children aged four years or older.
Finally, in the low-paid state we now distinguish between two groups of full- and
part-time workers, that is those with 30 working hours and more and those with less
than 30 working hours.12 The results of the multinomial logit model with random
eects for these ve labor market states are reported in Table 5. The impacts of the
control variables on high-pay, unemployment or inactivity in year t are similar to
those displayed for the base model in Table 3. Concerning the the control variables
on the two low-wage categories in Table 5, dierent eects are mainly observed for
`no partner in the household' (which has a negative marginal eect on the likelihood
10By construction, it was not possible to interact rm size or sector with unemployment or
inactivity in t   1.
11This is consistent with recent studies nding that women's labor supply at the rm level
is less wage-elastic than men's which may reect that women place greater importance on non-
pecuniary job characteristics and have higher opportunity costs of moving due to greater household
responsibilities (Hirsch et al., 2008).
12For a similar classication see Prowse (2008). Table 1 shows that that 67% of the observations
in low-pay work fall into the second category.
13of working low-pay and part-time) and for the number of children (which increases
the probability of working low-pay and part-time).
- Table 5 about here -
Transition probabilities from unemployment or inactivity into high-pay,
unemployment or inactivity are very similar to those reported in Table 3. We also
see that true state dependence still exists for low-paid women but is much more
pronounced for those working part-time. Concerning the prospect of reaching high-
pay employment in t, working low-paid in t 1 is still better than being unemployed
or inactive. This applies in particular to low-paid women working full-time, whose
chance of reaching a high-pay status are hardly lower than those of high-paid
women. As before, the probability of being unemployed or inactive in t rises with
unemployment in t   1 but is unaected by low-paid work in t   1 (irrespective
of working time). This again underscores our nding that working in low-paid jobs
provides better prospects than not working at all. Given that episodes of inactivity
and low-paid part-time work are much more common for women than for men, our
results also suggest that the lower incidence of females in the high-wage sector is not
only due to individual characteristics, preferences or discrimination but also reects
substantial state dependence.
5 Conclusions
This study analyzes true state dependence in low-wage employment of German
women and investigates whether it is better to take up a low-wage job or remain
unemployed and wait for a better job oer. Using panel data of the GSOEP and
taking account of the initial conditions problem, we estimate dynamic multinomial
logit models with random eects in order to analyze the eect of the experience of
low-wage employment on future employment prospects. We nd that there is true
state dependence in low-wage employment, i. e. being in a low-wage job reduces
14future employment prospects of German women by increasing the probability
of being low-paid and decreasing the chances of being high-paid in the future.
This eect is most pronounced for low-paid women working part-time. However,
concerning future wage prospects, low-paid women are clearly better o than
unemployed or inactive women. Being unemployed or inactive leads to a stronger
decline in the probability of getting a high-paid job than being low-paid and to a
higher probability of becoming unemployed or inactive again. In consideration of
this evidence, we argue that for women low-wage jobs can serve as stepping stones
out of unemployment and are to be preferred to staying unemployed and waiting
for a better job. To paraphrase Layard et al. (1991, p. 249) and to contradict them:
While having a low-paid job may be a bad signal, being unemployed seems to be a
worse one.
Further analysis suggests that the eect of low-paid jobs on future employment
prospects diers with respect to individual and rm characteristics. Low-paid women
working in large rms face a lower probability of getting unemployed or inactive
and better chances to move into a higher-paid job, indicating that some sources of
true state dependence in low-wage employment (such as insucient accumulation of
human capital) play a minor role in large rms. Besides, upward mobility of low-paid
women is lower when there are young children in the household.
While the existence of state dependence has been found before (see e.g.
Uhlendor (2006) for German men), we have been able to demonstrate that the
eect of low-wage jobs on future employment prospects diers with respect to rm
size, household context and working hours. This suggests that it may be worthwhile
to investigate the heterogeneity of this eect more deeply. For instance, taking
up a low-wage job could be more appropriate for long-term than for short-term
unemployed individuals. In addition, the eect of a low-wage job might also depend
on its duration. This could be tested in future research by using administrative data
with daily information and applying multivariate duration models (as employed, for
instance, by Cockx and Picchio (2009)).
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High- Low- Unem- Inac-
pay pay ployment tivity
Share of individuals 51.13 14.42 3.51 30.94
Number of individuals 1,690 730 276 1,132
Number of observations 6,044 1,705 415 3,657
No apprenticeship (dummy) 0.13 0.27 0.28 0.29
Apprenticeship (dummy) 0.71 0.68 0.63 0.63
University or technical college degree (dum.) 0.16 0.05 0.09 0.07
Age 40.10 38.70 38.82 37.67
Immigrant (dummy) 0.15 0.23 0.30 0.27
Handicap (dummy) 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.08
No partner in the household (dummy) 0.25 0.15 0.29 0.07
Monthly gross wage of the partner (in e) 2,137.32 2,213.25 1,622.70 2,774.86
Children (age: 0 - 3) (dummy) 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.37
Children (age: 4 - 6) (dummy) 0.10 0.15 0.25 0.31
Children (age: 7 - 10) (dummy) 0.16 0.26 0.25 0.35
Children (age: 11 - 17) (dummy) 0.30 0.44 0.36 0.35
Local unemployment rate (in percent) 8.65 8.91 9.08 8.77
Working hours: less than 30 (dummy) 0.40 0.67 0.00 0.00
Working hours: 30 and more (dummy) 0.60 0.33 0.00 0.00
Energy, mining, manufacturing (dummy) 0.18 0.17 0.00 0.00
Construction sector (dummy) 0.17 0.31 0.00 0.00
Services (dummy) 0.65 0.52 0.00 0.00
Firm size: less than 20 employees (dum.) 0.23 0.52 0.00 0.00
Firm size: 20{200 employees (dummy) 0.27 0.30 0.00 0.00
Firm size: more than 200 employees (dum.) 0.49 0.18 0.00 0.00
Data source: GSOEP 2000{2006; unbalanced panel; unweighted. 2,661 individuals (number is
lower than sum of the second row (Number of individuals) because some individuals enter more
than one state).
20Table 2: Transitions between labor market states
Period t
High- Low- Unem- Inac- Total
pay pay ploy- tivity
ment
Period t   1
High-pay 87.4 6.8 1.3 4.6 100.0
Low-pay 27.3 61.8 3.0 8.0 100.0
Unemployment 16.4 20.1 33.4 30.0 100.0
Inactivity 5.9 4.9 4.6 84.7 100.0
Total 51.13 14.42 3.51 30.94 100.0
Data source: GSOEP 2000-2006; unbalanced panel; unweigh-
ted; 11,821 observations from 2,661 individuals; gures indicate
row percentages.
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